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Introduction
"Money as a Weapon System", the title of one of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the Multi National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) speaks for itself. Using money and economic incentives as an element of national power to achieve your counterinsurgency goals is not an altogether new or exceptionally clever idea. However, the method by which the available money is employed to achieve the goal can be controversial and is much debated. The British military emphasizes large-scale projects in counterinsurgency operations channeling economic support through the central government and believes the American military's recent emphasis on local projects is like constructing "the world's most expensive camel sheds" where little thought is given to long-term sustainability. 1 The key American effort known as the Anbar Awakening used taxpayer funds to employ the Sons of Iraq, previously violently opposed to American occupation, to provide security in their own neighborhoods. Many point to this program as being a major contributor to GEN Petraeus' successful counterinsurgency campaign, commonly called the Surge, which has significantly improved security and stability across the theater. Many others believe we have merely purchased a mercenary army with loyalties up for the highest bidder.
On 11 September 2008, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, concluded that "we can't kill our way to victory"; there needs to be a renewed effort to build agriculture, economic, and education systems. In other words, military power by itself cannot achieve long-term success in Iraq, Afghanistan, or any other counterinsurgency effort. But economic incentives must be employed and leveraged appropriately in concert with other elements of national power to achieve the proper 
CERP Audit Findings
Due to the significant amount of US taxpayer funds appropriated for CERP, the few restrictions put on the program, and the high visibility of the projects, SIGIR has been tasked to submit an annual audit report to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the management of the program. Unfortunately, several SIGIR reports have consistently pointed to implementation and management issues concerning this flexible program that can be broadly categorized as targeting, disbursement, documentation, transition, and lessons learned. Table 1 demonstrates that funds applied under CERP are being utilized to fund many expensive, large-scale projects, although they were intended to primarily target small-scale projects to fill immediate needs of the indigenous population. As indicated in Table 1 , less than half (44%) of the total 18,381 projects were directed toward projects that cost $25,000 or below, accounting for just 4% of the total obligations associated with CERP funds. Roughly 8,088 small-scale projects were initiated between FY2004 and FY2007, which averages out to 2,022 projects per year or six small-scale projects per day across Iraq and Afghanistan. This number is less impressive when you consider that only 4% of the available funds were actually assigned against these small-scale projects.
Targeting
Contrast this to the CERP guidelines, which indicate that "the program's undertakings should primarily be small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects for the benefit of the Iraqi people." 9 Based on this data, it appears local commanders could use some assistance in executing projects and ensuring that more funds are leveraged into the local economy to increase stability and security. Afghanistan. This small number is in line with what would be expected based on the CERP guidelines. However, when the dollar value is examined, these large-scale projects obligate over a third of the available funds. This runs counter to where the CERP funds were meant to be targeted and indicates a lack of training and experience that can lead to waste and ineffectiveness. An example:
Outside Kirkuk, in northern Iraq, an $8.3 million water treatment project completed in February with CERP funds took more than two years and was $1.7 million over budget-and it is not far from another water treatment system that USAID paid $4.1 million to build two years ago, according to a top State Department official involved in the broader reconstruction efforts. 13 Large-scale projects, while well-intentioned, are generally more complex, require a more experienced workforce and oversight, require a more secure environment for an extended timeframe, and are more prone to cost overruns. It is not clear whether local economies outside major cities with a less educated workforce that is more susceptible to insurgent influence would receive significant benefit from larger projects, especially in the early phases of stability operations.
Disbursement
The data in Table 2 illustrate how disbursement can be another area of concern if funding is not targeted appropriately. The amount of CERP funds obligated versus authorized in theater ranges from 61% to 84% each fiscal year. This indicates that there
were not enough valuable and secure projects for managers to put money against or there was not enough time and contracting skills to obligate the significant amount of funds provided each year. Even more troubling is the amount disbursed each fiscal year into the local economies. These values range from a low of 24% to a dismal high of 39% each fiscal year. For money to be effectively employed as a weapons system, it must actually get disbursed where it is needed to influence behavior. Similar arguments have been made in reference to the current $787 billion economic stimulus package in the United States.
Estimates from the CBO on the stimulus package indicate "that about $200 billion will be spent in 2011 or later-well beyond when it will do the most good." 15 If money is not infused into a failing economy rapidly to relax credit and instill confidence, it will take longer to achieve the benefits of the recovery-political and economic stability, increasing employment numbers, decreasing conflict, and improvements to the local infrastructure.
There are many causes (corrupt government officials, violence, and politics-to name a few) on large infrastructure projects that create delays on disbursements that make trickle-down economics work very slowly and inefficiently. This makes it increasingly difficult to target accurately to ensure the money gets down to the local population to improve their lot in life and win their support. CERP should be directly applied at the lowest level where it is needed. When 76% of the money is not being paid out into the local economy as in FY2006, large portions of the weapon system are not having any effect.
Documentation
As highlighted in Table 3 , certifications indicating funds were disbursed were missing in almost half of the project files SIGIR sampled for this report. This implies that CERP funds are not being employed properly in accordance with program guidelines and may not be getting infused into the local economy for the maximum benefit.
Although the explanation for the lack of official documentation in the files is not clear, it is clear that more trained and experienced administrators need to be involved. The project files sampled provide no reasonable assurance that CERP funds are being appropriately obligated by authorized officials. And it is not apparent from the data whether 22% of the projects were ever completed. It may be that the security environment prevented project completion, but documentation would be expected in the files providing an audit trail for managers, auditors, and lastly accountability to the American taxpayer. The report indicates MNC-I did conduct training concerning CERP procedures;
however, "the continuing problems we identified again…suggest that additional attention is still needed." 17 The contracting specialty is highly trained to preserve and document files for future analysis. Although it may not seem critical at the time, accurate historical records can prevent wasteful, ineffective Stability projects as follow-on, inexperienced units rotate into the local area of operations. An example:
At a sewage treatment plant in Baghdad, the inspector general's auditors found that when a new US commander arrived in the area and discovered that the plant had no power, he would use CERP money to pay for a generator. That happened three times. "So at the end of the day, they've paid for the same generator three different times," said Cruz, the deputy inspector general for reconstruction. Local commanders should not have to shoulder this additional responsibility for contingency relief and reconstruction operations without assistance from the acquisition community. To ensure funds are consistently applied toward desired effects, the MNC-I CERP SOP specifically mentions that "close coordination between commanders, engineers, civil affairs, effects coordinators and comptrollers is vital. 22 Local commanders, as a minimum, should have a trained contract specialist working with their staff to interact with the PRT to assist with project management and oversight.
Lessons learned
Another persistent finding throughout past SIGIR audits is no controlled process for capturing and disseminating CERP lessons learned or best practices. It is well One excellent example of a lesson learned concerning local pay scales is found in our current doctrine for Stability Operations, FM 3-07. Knowledge and understanding of local pay scales is critical when establishing jobs programs as low salaries will be exploited by adversaries and high salaries will divert vital skills from important segments of the local economy. 23 The 
Opportunity for Change
The SIGIR audit reports make it clear that there are persistent and significant implementation and management problems in the CERP which threaten the program.
CERP funds should rarely be used for large-scale projects and audit findings should be addressed promptly to put the program back on track. Funded at $3.1 billion, CERP is a very important weapon in a local commander's arsenal and should be strengthened and reinforced. The employment of money in the area of operations and the ability to leverage and focus the effects requires special skills. Any weapons system requires training to be effective and will not have the same impact in the hands of a novice.
CERP funds are intended to be used to efficiently contract for local services to employ as Stability operations are a core US military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.
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The directive effectively elevated stability operations on par with offensive and defensive operations stressing that it was probably more important to the enduring The primary stability tasks from FM 3-07 are: 1) establish civil security, 2) establish civil control, 3) restore essential services, 4) support to governance, 5) support to economic and infrastructure development. 29 The contracting specialty is specifically referenced in FM 3-07 under the primary stability task of support to economic and infrastructure development. Under the subcategory of support to economic generation and enterprise creation, the doctrine relates that contracting duties can stimulate local economic recovery by actively engaging the local labor force. 30 Under the subcategory of support to private sector development, doctrine establishes that contracting should be used to strengthen the private sector during the transformation phase of stability operations. 31 Contracting should be used in support of these tasks to infuse money into the local economy and stimulate investment and development from the private sector. University. 35 This training will greatly enhance the abilities of the contracting professional to assist the local commander in utilizing CERP funds effectively.
Automated procurement systems are being developed which "will enable simplified cradle-to-grave management of our contracted support with improved oversight, visibility, traceability, and accountability throughout the contracting life cycle." 36 Automated systems will ensure there is good documentation and efficient processes to directly support the local commander with professional advice and assistance as the environment evolves through the various stages of the local stability operation.
ECC organizational structure
The most significant structural change to Army contracting resulted from the Similarly, SCCTs should be co-located and aligned with, but not assigned to, division staffs. 39 They would act in a general support role providing contract experience and expertise to the local commander and staff and senior level guidance to the CCTs at the subordinate brigades. Based on the mission, they could also organize under a Regional Contracting Cell or integrate with contract specialists from the other Services into a Joint Contracting Cell in support of division operations.
Enhanced training and CERP improvement
The CSB organizational structure outlined above allows better training focus at the local level to improve funds utilization in the CERP for more effective stability operations. CCTs and SCCTs working closely with the brigade and division staffs will be able to monitor the effectiveness of local contracts training. Ad hoc assignments of COR duties can be replaced with long-term assignments with ready access to the contract specialist and their automated contracting tools. In garrison, these skills can be honed through habitual relationships. Better access to templates and training on requirements writing for non-contract specialists will improve the velocity and efficiency of the 
